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Juror Testimony of Racial Bias in Jury Deliberations: 
United States v. Benally and the Obstacle of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 606(b)  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision United States v. Benally,1 
the court held that post-verdict juror testimony of racist comments 
made by fellow jurors during deliberations is inadmissible under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) (“Rule 606(b)”).2 According to the 
court, Rule 606(b) stands as a nearly insurmountable obstacle to the 
admission of any post-verdict juror testimony on statements made 
during jury deliberations, regardless of how objectionable or 
offensive those statements may be.3 In effect, the jury room is “a 
black box: the inputs (evidence and argument) are carefully regulated 
by law and the output (the verdict) is publicly announced, but the 
inner workings and deliberation of the jury are deliberately insulated 
from subsequent review.”4 
This Note will explore the Tenth Circuit’s decision United States 
v. Benally and argue that the court misapplied Rule 606(b) by 
relying on precedent that only tangentially addressed these issues. 
Further, this Note will investigate whether the Tenth Circuit, by 
holding that juror testimony of racial bias during deliberations is 
inadmissible under Rule 606(b), has advanced an interpretation of 
Rule 606(b) that potentially conflicts with the criminal defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2007, Defendant Kerry Dean Benally was “charged with 
forcibly assaulting a Bureau of Indian Affairs officer with a dangerous 
weapon.”5 Prior to his trial, Mr. Benally, a member of the Ute 
Mountain Ute tribe, asked several voir dire questions focused on 
 
 1. 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 2. Id. at 1231. 
 3. See id. at 1241. 
 4. Id. at 1233. 
 5. Id. at 1231. 
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revealing any potential prejudice towards Native Americans.6 Two of 
his submissions were used by the court: “‘Would the fact that the 
defendant is a Native American affect your evaluation of the case?’ 
and ‘Have you ever had a negative experience with any individuals of 
Native American descent? And, if so, would that experience affect 
your evaluation of the facts of this case?’”7 None of those eventually 
impaneled as jurors answered affirmatively to these questions.8  
On October 10, 2007, Mr. Benally was found guilty of the 
charged offense.9 The day after the announcement of the jury 
verdict, however, one juror contacted defense counsel and informed 
them that “the jury deliberation had been improperly influenced by 
racist claims about Native Americans.”10 According to the juror, the 
foreman stated that he had personally observed persons on an Indian 
Reservation and that “‘[w]hen Indians get alcohol, they all get 
drunk,’ and that when they get drunk, they get violent.”11 The juror 
further alleged that, although she argued with the foreman, other 
jurors appeared to have agreed with the foreman’s racist assertions.12 
The juror further alleged that in the course of deliberations some 
jurors spoke of the need to “‘send a message back to the 
reservation’” that you can’t “‘mess with police officers and get away 
with it.’”13 
Defense counsel obtained a signed affidavit from the juror and 
located one other juror who corroborated some of the first juror’s 
allegations.14 Based on the testimony of these two jurors, Mr. 
Benally moved for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.15 The trial court granted the motion in light of 
the prospect that some jurors had allegedly failed to answer voir dire 
questions concerning racial bias truthfully and had considered 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. United States v. Benally, No. 2:07CR256 DAK, 2007 WL 4166135, at *1 (D. 
Utah Nov. 20, 2007). 
 10. Benally, 546 F.3d at 1231. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 1231–32. 
 13. Id. at 1232. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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information not in evidence.16 The trial court noted that although 
Rule 606(b) generally forbids a juror from testifying as to the 
content of a jury’s deliberations, under the exceptions to the rule, a 
juror is allowed to testify “‘whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention, [or] 
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror.’”17 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Rule 606(b) 
The primary obstacle to the admission of juror testimony 
concerning evidence of racial bias that surfaces during jury 
deliberations is Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). Rule 606(b) is 
grounded in the “near-universal and firmly established common-law 
rule in the United States [that] flatly prohibited the admission of 
juror testimony to impeach a jury verdict.”18 At common law, 
exceptions to this rule “were recognized only in situations in which 
an ‘extraneous influence’ was alleged to have affected the jury.”19 
This common law rule, along with its exceptions for evidence of 
extraneous influences, was codified in Rule 606(b). This rule 
provides that when an inquiry is made into the validity of a verdict, a 
juror is incompetent to testify concerning (1) any statement made or 
matter occurring during the course of jury deliberations, (2) 
anything that had an effect on the juror’s or any other juror’s mind 
or emotions as influencing their decision, or (3) anything concerning 
“the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith.”20  
Prior to the Tenth Circuit decision, there existed a circuit split 
between the Ninth and Third Circuits as to the applicability of Rule 
606(b) in situations where evidence arises post-verdict that calls into 
question the impartiality of the jury. According to the Ninth Circuit, 
Supreme Court precedent allows for the introduction of evidence 
 
 16. United States v. Benally, No. 2:07CR256 DAK, 2007 WL 4166135, at *2 (D. 
Utah Nov. 20, 2007). 
 17. Id. at *1 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)). 
 18. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987). 
 19. Id. (citation omitted). 
 20. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
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that shows a prospective juror lied during voir dire.21 Consequently, 
if a juror was “asked direct questions about racial bias during voir 
dire, and . . . swor[e] that racial bias would play no part in his 
deliberations, evidence of that juror’s alleged racial bias is 
indisputably admissible for the purpose of determining whether the 
juror’s responses were truthful.”22 Under the Ninth Circuit view, 
such inquiries do not run afoul of Rule 606(b)’s prohibitions on jury 
testimony because such inquiries are not challenging the validity of 
the jury’s verdict, but whether a juror misled the court by falsely 
answering a material question on voir dire.23 If defendants can 
demonstrate that a juror “‘failed to answer honestly a material 
question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response 
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause,’ then 
they are entitled to a new trial.”24 
The Third Circuit, by contrast, has held that even though 
Supreme Court precedent allows for the introduction of evidence 
that may show a juror lied during voir dire, such evidence must first 
clear the Rule 606(b) hurdle.25 To the Third Circuit, although the 
Ninth Circuit depicts its investigation as merely an inquiry into the 
truthfulness of a juror’s voir dire responses, the practical effect of 
investigating a juror’s voir dire response is actually an indirect 
challenge to the validity of the jury verdict.26 Consequently, any 
evidence brought forth to support inquiries into the truthfulness of 
voir dire responses must first comply with Rule 606(b).27  
B. The Sixth Amendment 
The Sixth Amendment states that a criminal defendant “shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury . . . .”28 One of the basic requirements of an impartial jury is that 
the jurors will only consider the evidence before them and not take 
 
 21. See United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121 (2001) (citing McDonough 
Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984)). 
 22. Id. (citing Hard v. Burlington N. R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 464 U.S. at 556). 
 25. See Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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into account the defendant’s race or color.29 In situations where a 
juror comes forth with evidence of racism during jury deliberations, 
the policies and goals of Rule 606(b) and the Sixth Amendment 
squarely conflict. On the one hand, Rule 606(b) upholds the 
common law’s long-held commitment to the secrecy and 
unassailability of juror deliberations.30 On the other hand, the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees the accused criminal the right to an impartial 
tribunal that will decide the case only upon the evidence before it.31 
Lower courts have struggled to reconcile these competing values and 
“courts faced with the difficult issue of whether to consider evidence 
that a criminal defendant was prejudiced by racial bias in the jury 
room have hesitated to apply [Rule 606(b)] dogmatically.”32 
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether Rule 
606(b) wrongfully denies a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury when evidence of racial prejudice in the jury 
room is denied admission. The Supreme Court precedent that best 
discusses the competing values of Rule 606(b) and the Sixth 
Amendment is Tanner v. United States.33 In Tanner, the Court faced 
a challenge by the petitioner that the jury in the underlying case was 
incompetent because several members allegedly drank alcohol, 
smoked marijuana, and ingested cocaine during the course of the 
trial.34 The only evidence to support this motion, however, was 
testimony by one of the jurors who came forth after the trial and 
attested that he had either participated in or witnessed the various 
acts of misconduct.35 
In a narrow five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that 
Rule 606(b) applies in these types of instances and that none of the 
exceptions apply because “physical or mental incompetence of a 
juror [are treated] as ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ matters.”36 The 
Court then turned its attention to the Sixth Amendment, which the 
Court has recognized as granting the defendant “a right to a tribunal 
 
 29. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing how Rule 606(b) incorporates the “firmly established common-law rule”). 
 31. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (noting that the right to an 
impartial jury requires that a “verdict . . . be based upon the evidence developed at the trial”). 
 32. Wright v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 33. 483 U.S. 107 (1987). 
 34. Id. at 115–16. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 118. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
242 
both impartial and mentally competent to afford a hearing.”37 The 
Court found that although application of Rule 606(b) in these 
circumstances forecloses any opportunity to further investigate the 
incompetency of the jury, this obstacle, in and of itself, did not 
create a constitutional violation.38 To the Court, the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a competent jury was substantially 
protected by processes already in place at the trial level: voir dire can 
test a candidate’s suitability; the court, counsel, and court personnel 
can observe jury members; other jurors can observe their fellow 
jurors and can report any misconduct to the court “before they 
render a verdict;” and non-juror evidence can be admitted to 
challenge the competency of the jury after the verdict.39 Because of 
these substantial protections already in place, coupled with the 
“long-recognized and very substantial concerns support[ing] the 
protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry,” the Court 
rejected the Sixth Amendment challenges to Rule 606(b) and found 
that the right to a competent jury was already substantially protected 
by the trial process and procedures.40 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
At the Tenth Circuit, the court reversed the district court’s grant 
of a new trial.41 According to the Tenth Circuit, the trial court 
should have denied the motion because the only evidence offered in 
its support was juror testimony specifically proscribed by Rule 
606(b).42  
The Tenth Circuit stated that although Rule 606(b) is an 
evidentiary rule, “its role in the criminal justice process is substantive: 
it insulates the deliberations of the jury from subsequent second-
guessing by the judiciary.”43 Although the trial judge can 
meticulously regulate the evidence admitted before the jury in open 
court, the jury room is a “black box,” deliberately sealed against 
further judicial oversight.44 In short, “[j]uries provide no reasons, 
 
 37. Id. at 126 (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 
 38. See id. at 126–27. 
 39. Id. at 127. 
 40. Id. 
 41. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1233. 
 44. Id. 
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only verdicts.”45 
A. Should Rule 606(b) Apply? 
The first issue faced by the Tenth Circuit was whether Rule 
606(b) should apply to the Benally circumstances. As mentioned 
previously, prior to the Tenth Circuit decision there existed a split 
between the Ninth and Third Circuits on whether Rule 606(b) 
proscribes admission of juror testimony that is used to challenge the 
truthfulness of another juror’s voir dire responses. In reviewing the 
Ninth Circuit precedents described above, the Tenth Circuit found it 
difficult to accept the proposition that inquiries into the truthfulness 
of voir dire responses were not simply disguised inquiries into the 
validity of the jury’s verdict.46 As the court explained,  
[a]lthough the immediate purpose of introducing the testimony 
may have been to show that the two jurors failed to answer 
honestly during voir dire, the sole point of this showing was to 
support a motion to vacate the verdict, and for a new trial. That is a 
challenge to the validity of the verdict.47 
Based on this reasoning, the Tenth Circuit rejected the Ninth 
Circuit’s standard, echoing the claim by the Third Circuit that such a 
standard is “plainly too broad.”48 The court reasoned that “allowing 
juror testimony through the backdoor of a voir dire challenge risks 
swallowing the rule. A broad question during voir dire could then 
justify the admission of any number of jury statements . . . .”49 
Consequently the Tenth Circuit found that “[t]he Third Circuit’s 
approach best comports with Rule 606(b), and we follow it here.”50 
B. Do the Exceptions to Rule 606(b) Apply? 
Finding that Rule 606(b) applied, the Tenth Circuit turned its 
attention to the enumerated exceptions to the rule. Rule 606(b) 
contains three exceptions, two of which are relevant to this case: “‘a 
juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial 
information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention, [and] 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1235. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1236. 
 50. Id.  
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(2) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear 
upon any juror . . . .’”51  
The court rejected any assertion that a juror’s internal racial 
biases fall within either of these two exceptions.52 To the Tenth 
Circuit, these two exceptions only allow for the admission of 
statements concerning “extraneous influences.”53 Examples of such 
extraneous influences abound, such as “jurors reading news reports 
about the case, jurors communicating with third parties, bribes, and 
jury tampering.”54 According to the Tenth Circuit, however, internal 
biases do not qualify as extraneous influences contemplated by Rule 
606(b)’s exceptions. The court feared that interpreting either 
exception to instances of racial bias “would unravel the internal/ 
external distinction and make anything said in jury deliberations 
‘extraneous information’ so long as it was inappropriate.”55  
C. Is Rule 606(b) Unconstitutional? 
The last argument entertained by the Tenth Circuit was Mr. 
Benally’s assertion that Rule 606(b) is unconstitutional because it 
violates his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.56 Although 
the court found this to be his “most powerful argument,” the court 
ultimately rejected his assertion.57 The Tenth Circuit found that 
“[t]his Court . . . has consistently ‘upheld application of the Rule 
606(b) standards of exclusion of jury testimony even in the face of 
Sixth Amendment fair jury arguments.’”58 To strengthen this 
conclusion, the court turned its attention to the Supreme Court 
decision Tanner v. United States.59 The Tenth Circuit noted that 
although the trial procedures in Tanner failed to disclose the alleged 
juror misconduct during the course of the trial, the Supreme Court 
still found that “the Sixth Amendment did not compel an exception 
to Rule 606(b) . . . .”60 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that “Tanner 
 
 51. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 606(b)). 
 52. Id. at 1236–38. 
 53. Id. at 1236–37. 
 54. Id. at 1236. 
 55. Id. at 1238. 
 56. See id. at 1239–41. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1239 (quoting Braley v. Shillinger, 902 F.2d 20, 22 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
 59. 483 U.S. 107 (1987). 
 60. Benally, 546 F.3d at 1240 (citing Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127). 
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compel[led] a similar result in this case,” arguing “that the Sixth 
Amendment embodies a right to ‘a fair trial but not a perfect one, 
for there are no perfect trials.’”61 
The Tenth Circuit feared that “once it is held that the rules of 
evidence must be subordinated to the need to admit evidence of 
Sixth Amendment violations, we do not see how the courts could 
stop at the ‘most serious’ such violations.”62 Leery of this result, the 
court rejected Mr. Benally’s claims that Rule 606(b) is 
unconstitutional as applied and reversed the district court’s motion 
granting a new trial.63 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Interplay Between Rule 606(b) and Untruthful                          
Voir Dire Responses 
Although the Tenth Circuit held that Rule 606(b) clearly applies 
to circumstances challenging the truthfulness of voir dire responses, 
further investigation of the precedent relied upon by the court calls 
this conclusion into question. As mentioned previously, a circuit split 
existed between the Ninth and Third Circuits on whether Rule 
606(b) applies to juror testimony of racist jury deliberations when 
the juror was asked direct questions about racial bias during voir 
dire. This split actually stems from a 1984 Supreme Court case, 
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,64 in which a juror 
mistakenly failed to answer truthfully a question on voir dire about 
his background.65 The underlying case involved a child who had 
been severely injured in an accident and was suing the manufacturer 
for damages.66 During voir dire, the plaintiff’s attorney asked 
questions aimed at discovering whether any of the prospective jurors, 
or any of their immediate family members, had ever been severely 
injured in an accident.67 One of those eventually impaneled, who had 
a son who had been injured in an accident, failed to respond 
 
 61. Id. (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 
(1984)). 
 62. Id. at 1241. 
 63. Id. at 1242. 
 64. 464 U.S. at 548. 
 65. Id. at 549. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 549–50. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
246 
affirmatively to these questions because he mistakenly believed they 
were inapplicable to him.68 The jury later found for the manufacturer 
and the plaintiff moved for a new trial.69  
At the Supreme Court, the Court held that “to obtain a new trial 
in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed 
to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further 
show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a 
challenge for cause.”70 To demonstrate that the juror failed to 
answer truthfully, the plaintiff brought forth a signed affidavit from a 
Navy Recruiter who could attest to the fact that the juror’s son had 
disclosed on his Navy application that he had been “injured in the 
explosion of a truck tire.”71  
Because the juror’s failure to answer the voir dire question was 
demonstrated through non-juror testimony, McDonough did not 
involve circumstances that trigger Rule 606(b). Consequently, 
although the standard announced in McDonough is relatively 
straightforward, the decision itself is silent as to the appropriate role 
of Rule 606(b) in post-verdict challenges of voir dire responses. 
With this background in mind, the Third Circuit decision relied 
upon by the Tenth Circuit is not so determinative of the issue as the 
Tenth Circuit suggests. In Williams, the Third Circuit was asked to 
evaluate whether a petitioner was entitled to federal habeas relief 
from a state court adjudication.72 Under such circumstances, the 
standard of review is whether the state court decision was “‘contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.’”73 Under this strict standard, the Third Circuit was not 
evaluating whether challenges to voir dire must comply with the 
requirements of Rule 606(b), but whether it was clearly established 
that voir dire challenges are beyond the scope of Rule 606(b). As 
mentioned previously, the circumstances involved in McDonough in 
no way implicated Rule 606(b), and, consequently, the McDonough 
decision says nothing about whether voir dire challenges must 
comply with Rule 606(b). In light of this context, the Third 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 548–51. 
 70. Id. at 556.  
 71. Id. at 551. 
 72. Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 73. Id. at 228–29 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2002) (emphasis removed)). 
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Circuit’s decision seems appropriate under a “clearly established” 
standard, but ultimately unhelpful to the Benally controversy.  
Once the Third Circuit decision is limited to its appropriate 
contours, the only circuit to squarely address the issue is the Ninth 
Circuit. Under the Ninth Circuit approach, because the jurors were 
asked two questions directly aimed at revealing racial prejudice 
during voir dire, Rule 606(b) would not be implicated and Benally 
could use juror testimony to challenge the truthfulness of the 
offending jurors’ responses. Benally would then have an opportunity 
to demonstrate that the juror’s failure to respond honestly stripped 
him of an opportunity to remove these jurors for cause.  
The Tenth Circuit’s most compelling challenge to the Ninth 
Circuit approach is its contention that, as the operative effect of a 
successful challenge to a voir dire response is to invalidate the jury’s 
verdict, the process should be characterized as a challenge to the 
validity of the underlying verdict.74 In looking at the operative effect 
of other evidence rules, however, the Tenth Circuit’s fears appear to 
be overstated. The Rules of Evidence constantly permit evidence to 
be admitted for one purpose while forbidding it for others—even 
though the practical effect is the same. For example, a statement may 
be inadmissible hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter asserted 
but may be admissible for some other purpose.75 The practical effect, 
however, is that the evidence is admitted to the jury with a limiting 
instruction from the judge that the evidence only be considered for 
the admissible purpose.  
B. Constitutionality of Rule 606(b) as Applied 
In finding that Rule 606(b) denies admission of evidence that 
challenges the impartiality of the jury, the Tenth Circuit has 
advanced an interpretation of Rule 606(b) that potentially conflicts 
with the Sixth Amendment. To be fair, the Tenth Circuit considered 
this potential constitutional complication and rejected it as being 
unsupported by Supreme Court precedent. That being said, the 
precedent relied upon by the Tenth Circuit is distinguishable from 
Benally in several important respects and fails to fully justify the 
Tenth Circuit’s holding.  
In rejecting Benally’s assertion that Rule 606(b) is 
 
 74. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 75. See FED. R. EVID. 801. 
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unconstitutional, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily upon Tanner v. 
United States. Although the Tenth Circuit is correct in finding 
Tanner as the closest analog to the Bennally controversy, important 
distinctions remain. Perhaps the most intriguing distinction between 
Tanner and Benally is that Tanner involved a challenge based on 
juror incompetence, while Benally involved a challenge of juror 
impartiality. Although it is true that both incompetence and 
impartiality are addressed by the Sixth Amendment, the United 
States’ complicated history with racial biases and prejudices in the 
court room warns against treating the two identically.76 In light of 
the fact that the Tanner outcome was so narrow, a challenge to Rule 
606(b) under circumstances involving racial prejudice could merit a 
different outcome.  
The suggestion that a situation involving racial prejudice may 
result in a different outcome than Tanner is bolstered by lower court 
decisions that have directly considered whether the Sixth 
Amendment requires the admission of jury testimony of racial 
prejudice. For example, one court stated that “if a criminal defendant 
could show that the jury was racially prejudiced, such evidence could 
not be ignored without trampling the sixth amendment’s guarantee 
to a fair trial and an impartial jury.”77 Or as a court in the Seventh 
Circuit explained, “[w]here . . . an offer of proof showed that there 
was a substantial likelihood that a criminal defendant was prejudiced 
by the influence of racial bias in the jury room, to ignore the 
evidence might very well offend fundamental fairness.”78  
These suggestions by the lower courts that such situations run 
afoul of the Sixth Amendment are bolstered by the fact that the Sixth 
Amendment protections cited by the Supreme Court in Tanner fail 
to protect against instances of racial prejudice that arise during jury 
deliberations. Unlike juror misconduct such as that in Tanner where 
the juror’s ingestion of drugs and alcohol could be quite apparent to 
a careful observer, a juror’s racial prejudice might not surface until 
jury deliberations. “Indeed, that appears to be precisely what 
occurred here: despite the district court’s best efforts at protecting 
Mr. Benally’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, the jury 
foreman clearly lied during the voir dire proceedings about his ability 
 
 76. See, e.g., Strauder v. W. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
 77. Wright v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 78. Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1978). 
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to be impartial.”79  
Perhaps the best way to assess whether the Sixth Amendment 
requires the allowance of juror testimony in this limited circumstance 
is to ask whether admitting this evidence is to “insist on something 
closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to 
give.”80 Certainly, there are no perfect trials and to insist on such 
would jeopardize the viability of the judicial system. But, in instances 
such as Benally where alleged juror misconduct rises to the level of 
racial prejudice, the Sixth Amendment requirement of an impartial 
jury appears to require further investigation. Under these 
circumstances, it is not insisting upon perfection to give the trial 
court discretion to hold a limited evidentiary hearing to investigate 
the matter and decide whether a new trial is warranted.81 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Benally, the Tenth Circuit upheld the 
common-law tradition, codified in Rule 606(b), that jury 
deliberations should be kept secret except in the most exceptional 
circumstances. To the Tenth Circuit, keeping jury deliberations 
locked from further review protects the finality of judgments, 
encourages open discussion amongst jurors, and instills within jurors 
an “urgency that comes from knowing that their decision is the final 
word.”82  
While Rule 606(b) advances important policy goals, safeguarding 
jury decisions based on racial bias or prejudice should not be among 
them. In the limited circumstances where a juror comes forth, post-
verdict, with testimonial evidence of racist jury deliberations, courts 
should be allowed to hold a limited evidentiary hearing to investigate 
the matter and to determine whether a new trial is warranted.  
Brandon C. Pond 
 
 
 79. United States v. Benally, 560 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2009) (Briscoe, J., 
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). 
 80. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 555 (1984). 
 81. This is currently the approach taken in the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. 
Henley, 238 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 82. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008). 
  B.A., University of Utah; J.D. candidate, April 2010, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
 Brigham Young University. 
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